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COMMENT
REVEREND RICHARD A. MUNKELT
I am pleased to offer some comments on Professor Michael White’s ex-cellent paper concerning the law-like nature of practical reason, which
was presented in honor of the extraordinary life achievement of Professor
John Finnis.  And I should like to thank the organizers of the Scarpa Con-
ference of the Villanova University School of Law for inviting me to do so.
In his paper, Professor White locates the law-like nature of practical
reason, the prescriptive aspect of human intelligence, in its very un-
modern property of heteronomy.  This nicely brings out a fundamental
opposition between ancient and modern moral philosophy, namely, that
between heteronomy and autonomy.
Ever since Rousseau and Kant, we have been taught that morality logi-
cally depends on freedom and that freedom depends on the will freely
imposing law on itself, that is, the possibility of morality requires the will to
be an autonomous faculty.  As Professor White shows, the Western and
classical moral tradition going back to the Stoics has held to a heterono-
mous view of moral norms: morality is grounded in a higher law.  I would
add that this view can be traced back to the Pre-Socratics who give us a
potent adumbration of this view and even, in some cases, an explicit for-
mulation of it.  To cite but one example, take the magnificent fragment of
Heraclitus, himself an inspiration to the Stoics: “For all the laws of men
are nourished by one law, the divine law.”1
Both in Heraclitus and in Plato’s Laws we are presented with the spe-
cific terms of human and divine law, anthropos nomos and theios nomos, re-
spectively.  It is because the universe is ruled by divine law that it is
eukosmos or, as it were, a happy cosmos because well-ordered.  Such a uni-
verse is suitable for the common life of rational beings, a social life within
the recognizable divine government of the universe.  This idea of the cos-
mos became a commonplace of analogical practical thought in Hellenistic
moral and political philosophy and it had an influence on St. Paul who
hailed from Tarsus, a city suffused with popular Greek philosophy.
Aristotle, as Professor White brings out, was not given to making anal-
ogies between human law and the divine order of things, and this because
Aristotle’s God did not create or fabricate the universe and does not exer-
cise a conscious government and providence over it.  Thus, the supreme
being of Aristotle is not strictly a lawgiver, but is rather a supreme final
cause alone, enclosed within its contemplative separated substance and
drawing the natural world unconsciously to its perfect state of being.  How-
1. G.S. KIRK & J.E. RAVEN, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 213 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1957).
(921)
1
Munkelt: Comment
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-5\VLR512.txt unknown Seq: 2 13-DEC-12 13:05
922 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 921
ever, even in Aristotle there is a definite appreciation of human reason,
the locus of speculative and practical first principles, as being something
divine or standing in relation to the divine.  Furthermore, it is because
Aristotelian science puts forward a teleological universe that we have the
classical norm of the moral analysis of human acts, to wit, the divinely
grounded finality of nature and of human nature in particular.  As such, it
would not be inappropriate to speak of a natural or divine law of teleology
in Aristotle.  This is certainly a heteronomous world-view, one which has
been traditionally a rich source of ethical, and especially natural-law, re-
flection, feeding the practical thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and many
others.
In recent times within the natural-law tradition, but echoing innova-
tions in Hobbes and Grotius (e.g., the attempt to understand the natural
moral law without God or metaphysics), there have been various philo-
sophical efforts, the natural-law theories of Professors Finnis and Germain
Grisez among them, which have tried to disentangle teleology from moral
analysis.  Such disentanglement, it would appear, is meant to avoid certain
metaphysical commitments.  Presumably, this is because of the oppro-
brium covering things metaphysical and teleological since Darwin and of
the historical victory of modern natural science in general.  This victory
has enclosed us in an empire of chance or in a cosmos ruled by necessity
without intentionality.  In such states of affairs, how are we to build a via-
ble moral system, and on what basis?  Is ethics in the wake of the findings
of modern science possible at all?
The efforts of contemporary natural-law theorists have often tried to
secure the validity and justification of practical first principles in a combi-
nation of self-evidence and universal anthropological behavior, revealing a
commonly acceptable equality of circumscribed goods.  However, as Pro-
fessor White’s emphasis on the heteronomy of practical reason would sug-
gest, these grounds, which are by no means to be despised, would only
constitute a necessary but insufficient justification, an incomplete justifica-
tion at best of moral principles.  A complete justification, indeed a final
one, must recognize, in a speculative manner with immediate practical
consequences, that man is neither the author of his own being nor of the
laws of right conduct.  Therefore, the ontological and teleological recogni-
tion of a necessary and divine author of natural being, normativity, and
obligation is the ultimate sine qua non of moral theory and of any ethical
system.  We are not beings as such but contingent beings, beings of a crea-
turely mode, as Professor White references.  Thus, the positing of an au-
tonomous will in the modern sense might be considered a form of
usurpation and hence unlawful.
Moreover, though Aristotle (not Plato nor Cicero) is practically silent
on the virtue of religion, St. Thomas Aquinas makes religion the supreme
moral virtue.2  Religion here is the natural virtue through which men pay
2. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IIa–IIae, q. 81, a. 6.
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to God the worship and reverence which they owe to him as the first prin-
ciple and governor of things.  This would appear necessarily to speak to a
hierarchy in the order of human goods, something which most contempo-
rary moral theorists, even those inspired by Thomas, do not endorse.
Finally, I wish to touch briefly on the matter of the modern is/ought
divergence inasmuch as Professor White alludes to David Hume, whose
300th birthday is commemorated in 2011.  This putative divergence has
also been a matter of interest in discussions surrounding the ethical writ-
ings of Professor Finnis.  Given the subscription to moral naturalism on his
part, Hume did not mean by said divergence, of which he is the source,
that no natural facts (the is) imply moral truths (the ought).  After all, for
Hume, man’s sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are the natu-
ral basis of judgments of right and wrong.  What Hume meant, therefore,
by no ought from is, is that only from moral natural facts (e.g., human
sentiments), as opposed to non-moral natural facts, can we derive moral
truths; this was to safeguard his moral theory from teleology.  Contrari-
wise, St. Thomas would say there are teleological facts about the universe
and, in particular, human nature that are speculative or metaphysical
truths with rational implications for practical norms.  In other words, and
to conclude, natural human inclinations (the teleological facts of human
nature) imply ends, end implies good, good implies ought or obligation,
obligation implies law.  Hence, we find an is/ought convergence, getting
us from non-moral natural facts to moral laws.
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